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ABSTRACT

Scholars are increasingly arguing that consumer law can be a site of
distribution. This raises at least two concerns: the classic argument associated
with Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell against redistributingincome through legal
rules, and a more recent concern that additional equity in consumer law will
mean less equity in other important domains. In this Essay, I defend the pivot
toward distribution by largely sidestepping these issues. Rather than arguing
that consumer law is a good site for distributionand that it will not crowd out
other options, I suggest that the pivot toward distribution is justified by the

structure of consumer credit markets.
Leveraging insightsfrom the recent literatureon the legal design of money, I
argue that consumer credit is best understood as new money, and price and
access in consumer credit markets are best understood as ways to finance the
privatedisbursement ofpublic obligations. The upshot of thisframing is it offers
a new way to think about the function and potential of consumer law and
consumer credit regulation. Consumer credit regulation is best understoodas a
way to shift the incidence offinancing the creation of new money and not as an
intervention in purely private exchange. As such, it has the potential to unwind
some of the regressivity of money creation in our system by progressively
redistributingburdens in credit markets. In this Essay, I consider how these
ideas can change the way we justy consumer law and regulate consumer credit

markets.

* Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. For valuable comments and feedback,
I thank Julian Arato, Daniel Markovitz, Patricia McCoy, Luc Figueiredo Miller, Frank
Pasquale, Rory Van Loo, Ramsi Woodcock, and participants at the Law, Markets, and
Distribution Symposium at the Boston University School of Law. I also thank Kyle Angelotti
and the editors of the Boston University Law Review for their patience and thoughtful edits,
which this Essay greatly benefitted from.
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SHIFTING BURDENS AT THE FRINGE
INTRODUCTION

The primary justification for modern consumer financial regulation is
allocative efficiency.' Consumer credit markets feature large imbalances
between financial institutions and consumers. 2 Financial institutions can
leverage these imbalances in ways that are both costly for consumers and
inefficient. 3 And, at its best, consumer financial regulation is a tool that can
4
prevent or dampen the effects these inefficiencies have on consumers.
But efficiency has its limits as a justification. Inefficiency is often difficult to
prove. 5 Transactions that seem unambiguously inefficient (for example, short6
term credit with an outrageously high interest rate) might be efficient.
for
the
Moreover, focusing on efficiency and ignoring equity fails to account
way certain transactions might offend basic notions of fairness. 7 As a result,

See, e.g., Luke Herrine, What is Consumer Protection For?, 32 Loy. CONSUMER L. REv.
(forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 4) (available at https://papers.ssm.com/sol3

/papers.cfin?abstractid=3781762

[https://perma.cc/2W3V-65PD])

[hereinafter Herrine,

Consumer Protection] (arguing that law and economics understanding of efficiency, which
Herrine describes as the "consumer sovereignty framework," orients most consumer law
scholarship); Rory Van Loo, Broadening Consumer Law: Competition, Protection, and
Distribution, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 211, 220 (2019) [hereinafter Van Loo, Consumer Law]
("Many existing consumer protection laws, and many calls for new regulation by legal
scholars, aim to lessen information asymmetries and behavioral biases, in part because this
foundational economic theory holds that markets function best, and society benefits most,
when consumers are informed and rational."). Efficiency as I use it here generally refers to

the "efficiency produced by well-functioning markets not subject to [market] failures."
ELIZABETH POPP BERMAN, THINKING LIKE AN ECONOMIST: How EFFICIENCY REPLACED

EQUALITY IN U.S. PUBLIC POLICY 15 (2022) (discussing varieties of efficiency in public

policy).
2 Classic accounts emphasized domination and bargaining asymmetry. See, e.g., Friedrich
Kessler, The Contracts ofAdhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,43 COLUM.
L. REv. 629, 632 (1943); Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-an Essay in Perspective,
40 YALE L.J. 704, 717 (1931). Modern accounts emphasize information asymmetry and
bounded rationality. See discussion infra Part I.
3 See discussion infra Part I.
4 See Herrine, Consumer Protection, supra note 1 (manuscript at 4) ("Those who favor
[consumer] regulation tend to argue that actually existing markets are littered with 'market
failures' and 'transaction costs' that clog up market forces."); Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins,

Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REv. 855, 884 (2007) ("In sum, the best case against payday
lending is that the market is plagued by cognitive failures, unlikely to be well policed by
competitive forces, and likely to generate external costs borne by the rest of society.").
5 See discussion infra Part I.
6 See infra Part I.
Cf Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability's Safety Net Function, 58 ALA. L.

REv. 73, 74 (2006) (discussing fairness norms underlying unconscionability doctrine).
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scholars are increasingly turning to distribution as an alternative ground for
justifying interventions in consumer credit markets.8
A pivot toward distribution raises two issues. First, is consumer law a good
site for wealth distribution? There is extensive literature questioning the wisdom
of pursuing wealth distribution through the law. 9 Second, what are the costs of
pursuing wealth distribution through consumer law? Will more equity in
consumer law mean less equity in other important domains?
The recent literature on distribution attempts to navigate efficiency-equity
tradeoffs' 0 and to manage the problems of path dependency in different ways."
In this Essay, I defend the pivot toward distribution in consumer law by largely
sidestepping these issues. Rather than arguing that consumer law is a good site

for distribution and that it will not crowd out other options, I consider the costs
of ignoring distribution in consumer law. And I argue that these costs suggest
we ought to pursue distributional goals through consumer law, even if it is
suboptimal or may crowd out other options.
The main move in this Essay is a structural one. There is an emerging shift in

legal scholarship away from conceptualizing markets as unstructured and selfcorrecting to legally structured and actively governed.' 2 Recent examples of this
shift include efforts to understand how the law structures and distributes burdens
in housing and student finance and how legal changes in these areas are best

8 See Vijay Raghavan, Consumer Law's Equity Gap, 2022 UTAH L. REv. (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 4) (available at https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3812412
[https://perma.cc/PB79-JPN3]); John Linarelli, Debt in Just Societies: A General Framework
for Regulating Credit, 14 REGUL. & GOVERNANCE 409,409 (2020); Van Loo, Consumer Law,
supra note 1, at 211; Michael D. Guttentag, Law and Surplus: Opportunities Missed, 2019
UTAH L. REv. 607, 617; Chrystin Ondersma, A Human Rights Approach to Consumer Credit,
90 TUL. L. REv. 373, 418 (2015).
9 See discussion infra Part I.

10

For example, Rory Van Loo and Michael Guttentag separately suggest there might be

opportunities to distribute "overcharge" or "surplus" without significant efficiency losses. See
Van Loo, Consumer Law, supra note 1, at 213; Guttentag, supra note 8, at 610.
" In other work, I suggest the problems of path dependency may be overstated, and
pursuing more distribution in consumer law may not necessarily crowd out other options. See
Raghavan, supra note 8 (manuscript at 8); see also John Linarelli, Equality and Access to
Credit: A Social Contract Framework, 84 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBS. 165, 178-79 (2021)
(recognizing that credit-welfare tradeoffs may exist but justifying intervention in consumer
credit markets on Rawlsian grounds).

12 See, e.g.,

KATHARINA PIsTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL: How THE LAW CREATES WEALTH

AND INEQUALITY 2-3 (2019); William Boyd, Ways of Price Making and the Challenge of
Market Governance in U.S. Energy Law, 105 MINN. L. REv. 739, 743 (2020); Sanjukta Paul,

Antitrust as Allocator of Coordination Rights, 67 UCLA L. REv. 378, 378 (2020); Nathan
Tankus & Luke Herrine, Competition Law as Collective Bargaining Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF LABOR IN COMPETITION LAW (manuscript at 1) (Sanjukta Paul, Shae McCrystal
& Ewan McGaughey eds., forthcoming May 2022); Herrine, Consumer Protection, supra
note 1 (manuscript at 3).
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understood as ways to reallocate burdens in those markets.' 3 In this Essay, I seek
to extend this methodological approach to fringe finance.' 4
This Essay makes two claims. The first is that consumer credit is a way to

create and distribute new money. The second is that price and access in
consumer credit markets are ways to distribute the burdens of disbursing public
money through private means. In making these claims, I build on several insights
from the recent scholarship on the legal design of money. Core claims of that
scholarship are that the legal design of money shapes exchange and matters for
distribution,1 5 that our current legal arrangement relies on financial institutions
to expand the money supply by distributing public obligations in something that

resembles a franchise relationship,' 6 and that most new money is generated and
7
allocated through private extensions of credit.'

As I argue below, a natural implication of these observations is that the cost
of credit and access to credit are ways of financing the private disbursement of
public obligations. The law determines how these disbursement costs are
allocated. Under a permissive legal regime (like our own), financial institutions
have broad freedom to determine access and price credit, and the burdens are
disproportionately borne by poorer consumers who have sporadic access to
credit at high cost.18 Under a restrictive legal regime, financial institutions have
limited freedom to determine access and price credit, and the burdens are
distributed more broadly.
This framing has two important virtues. First, it reveals the public nature of

consumer credit markets and how interventions in these markets are less about
19
unsettling private exchanges and more about incidence shifting. This does not

13 See, e.g., ADAM J. LEVITIN & SUSAN M. WACHTER, THE GREAT AMERICAN HOUSING
BUBBLE: WHAT WENT WRONG AND How WE CAN PROTECT OURSELVES IN THE FUTURE 1
(2020); Jonathan D. Glater, Student Debt andHigherEducation Risk, 103 CAL. L. REv. 1561,
1577-79 (2015); John R. Brooks, Income-Driven Repayment and the Public Financing of

HigherEducation, 104 GEo. L.J. 229, 246 (2016).
1 I use the term fringe finance and fringe credit here to broadly include financial products
primarily offered to poor consumers. This would include any bank and nonbank products that
are commonly understood as fringe (e.g., payday loans, title loans, overdraft) and newer
products on the margins (e.g., installment loans, wage advance products).
"

See

CHRISTINE DESAN, MAKING MONEY: COIN, CURRENCY, AND THE COMING OF

23 (2014); DAvID GRAEBER, DEBT:
(discussing credit and state theories of money).
CAPITALISM
"

THE FIRST 5,000 YEARS

46-52 (2011)

See Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL L.

REV. 1143, 1147 (2017).
17 See Christine Desan, The Key to Value: The Debate over Commensurability in Neoclassical and Credit Approaches to Money, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 14 (2020);
ANDREW JACKSON & BEN DysON, MODERNISING MONEY: WHY OUR MONETARY SYSTEM IS
BROKEN AND HOw IT CAN BE FIXED 22 (2012).

18

See discussion infra Section II.C.
19 In this sense, legislative or regulatory changes are not interventions at all but simply a
reallocation of benefits and burdens.
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mean that broad interventions are always wise but that these interventions
involve a different set of tradeoffs than those that are presently debated.
Second, it allows one to support more consumer credit regulation without
believing in the generative potential of consumer credit markets. How money
should be created and distributed is a first-order question of monetary design.
This is true for both fully public systems and public-private hybrids. Ignoring
distributional issues in the legal design of money can undermine other important
social goals. 20 For this reason, current proposals to nationalize parts of our
banking system tend to be distributionally neutral or progressive with respect to
new money creation. 21
This Essay argues that these concerns do not disappear when the monetary

system is a kludgy public-private hybrid like our own. In many ways, these
concerns become more acute. If we leave consumer credit markets largely
unregulated and focus exclusively on direct state support, unregulated consumer
credit markets might undermine the efficacy of direct state support.22 Though
nationalizing our banking is one way to solve this problem, to the extent we keep
our present monetary structure, consumer law can help unwind some of the
regressivity in consumer credit markets. 23 In other words, we ought to intervene
in consumer credit markets not because credit is an important form of social
provision but because we presently allocate

our money through private

institutions and finance this scheme with what are functionally regressive
taxes. 24

The remainder of this Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the shape
of conventional debates in consumer law. Part II details how a
reconceptualization of the problems in consumer credit markets along structural
lines can help overcome some of the problems with conventional rationales.
Finally, Part III sketches out some implications for the regulation of consumer
credit.

infra Part III.
See Saule T. Omarova, The People's Ledger: How to Democratize Money and Finance
the Economy, 74 VAND. L. REv. 1231, 1261 (2021) (noting that public money creation might
be best issued on a "progressive scale" to "channel more funds to the people who both need
it most and will be more likely to spend the money on daily purchases").
22 Paul Kiel & Jeff Ernsthausen, Debt Collectors Have Made a Fortune This Year. Now
They're
Coming for
More,
PRoPUBLICA
(Oct.
5,
2020,
5:00
AM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/debt-collectors-have-made-a-fortune-this-year-nowtheyre-coming-for-more [https://perma.cc/XEZ7-QXXZ] (discussing how Americans used
stimulus money to service existing debts); cf Matthew Adam Bruckner, Debtor-Creditor
Issues with Basic Income Guarantees, 29 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 171, 174 (2021) (arguing
that basic income guarantees "could leave the poorest and most vulnerable in our society
worse off' without consumer protections against debt collectors).
23 See infra Section H.C.
24 See generally Abbye Atkinson, Rethinking Credit as Social Provision, 71 STAN. L. REv.
1093 (2019) [hereinafter Atkinson, Rethinking Credit] (conceiving of credit as regressive
redistribution harming the poor).
20 See
21
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MARKET DISTORTIONS AND MARKET FAILURE

Modem debates over the wisdom of consumer law tend to prioritize efficiency
over fairness or other goals. 25 This was not always the case. Historic consumer
credit laws were justified in moral terms, but moral concerns were displaced by
26
market-oriented concerns in the late twentieth century. While it is hard to
identify a single event that caused this shift, its beginnings and the eventual
shape of modern discourse in consumer credit law were evident in debates over
the wisdom of Williams v. Walker-Thomas FurnitureCo.

27

fifty years ago.

Williams concerned credit sales between Walker-Thomas Furniture and Ora
Lee Williams. Ora Lee Williams was a single mother with seven children whose
28
sole source of income was $218 of monthly public assistance. From 1957 to
1962, Williams signed at least fourteen contracts to purchase household goods
on credit from Walker-Thomas Furniture. 29 Unbeknownst to Williams, the
contracts contained a pro rata clause that permitted Walker-Thomas to seize all
30
the goods Williams had purchased on credit. After her monthly payments
sharply increased in late 1962, Williams defaulted and Walker-Thomas sued to
recover all the goods Williams had purchased on credit since 1957.31 At the time
of her default, Williams had paid Walker-Thomas over $1,000.32
Williams' case and a companion case involving Walker-Thomas wound up at
33
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. In a now-famous majority opinion, Judge
Skelly Wright found that Walker-Thomas's pro rata clause might violate the

common law doctrine of unconscionability if Williams lacked "meaningful
choice" and the contracts terms were "unreasonably favorable" to WalkerThomas. 34 Skelly Wright's opinion and the doctrine of unconscionability have

2 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
26 See Luke Herrine, The Folklore of Unfairness, 96 N.Y.U. L. REv. 431, 435, 445 (2021)
[hereinafter Herrine, Folklore] (discussing moral economy roots of "unfair or deceptive acts
and practices" prohibitions and market-oriented shift in late twentieth century); Christopher
L. Peterson, Usury Law, PaydayLoans, andStatutory Sleight of Hand: Salience Distortionin
American CreditPricingLimits, 92 MuNN. L. REv. 1110, 1111 (2008) (reviewing changes in
usury laws in last twenty years); see also Schmitz, supra note 7, at 75 (discussing moral
foundations of unconscionability). For a recent history on the intellectual shift in American
public policy in the latter half of twentieth century, see generally PoPP BERMAN, supra note

1.
27

350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).

28 Id. at 448.
29

Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 198 A.2d 914, 915 (D.C. 1964).

30

Id.

3'

Anne Fleming, The Rise and Fall of Unconscionabilityas the 'Law of the Poor,' 102

GEO. L.J. 1383, 1397 (2014) [hereinafter Fleming, Unconscionability].
32 Id. at 1396.
Williams, 350 F.2d at 445.
34 Id. at 449-50.
33
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been the subject of extensive scholarly debate and critique since the Williams
decision was originally issued in 1965.35
Early critiques suggested that unconscionability was paternalistic 36 and
indeterminate. 37 In 1975, Richard Epstein offered a somewhat different
critique.38 Epstein argued that unconscionability was not bad merely because it
was indeterminate but because it was inefficient. 39 In particular, Epstein argued
that add-on clauses like the one used by Walker-Thomas provide sellers with
additional security limiting their loss in case a buyer defaults. 40 Without the
option to include a pro rata clause, sellers like Walker-Thomas might increase
prices to minimize their losses when buyers default. 41 Thus, rather than helping
poor consumers like Williams, a ban on such clauses may harm these consumers
by pricing them out of the market for necessary household goods. Epstein did
suggest that unconscionability might be justified in limited cases of duress or
fraud where the transaction does not reflect individual preferences. 42
The beauty of Epstein's simple efficiency argument was that it extended

beyond Williams and the unconscionability doctrine. Any intervention in
consumer financial markets that limited creditors' freedom to manage risk could
be inefficient and regressive. 43 This included efforts to regulate industries with
3

See, e.g., Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New

Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 488, 551-58 (1967); Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability:
A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293, 306-08 (1975); Robert A. Hillman, Debunking
Some Myths About Unconscionability: A New Framework for U.C.C. Section 2-302, 67
CORNELL L. REv. 1, 3 (1981); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form
Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1203, 1203 (2003); Charles L. Knapp,
Blowing the Whistle on Mandatory Arbitration: Unconscionability as a Signaling Device, 46
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 609, 610 (2009); Hazel Glenn Beh, Curing the Infirmities of the

Unconscionability Doctrine, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1011, 1011 (2015).
This is a point Judge Dahner implied in his dissent, noting that there had been no finding
of "sharp practice" by Walker-Thomas and that Williams "seems to have known precisely
36

where she stood." Williams, 350 F.2d at 450 (Dahner, J., dissenting).
37 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return
of Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J.

ON DisP. RESOL. 757, 763 n.22 (2004) (listing early critiques arguing unconscionability
concept was "too plastic").
3 See generally Epstein, supra note 35.
3 See id at 307.

40 See id.
41 See id. Judge

Dahner made a similar point in his dissent: "Many relief clients may well
need credit, and certain business establishments will take long chances on the sale of items,
expecting their pricing policies will afford a degree of protection commensurate with the

risk." Williams, 350 F.2d at 450 (Dahner, J., dissenting).
42 Epstein, supra note 35, at 294-95.
43 Intervening in consumer credit markets might close credit markets to consumers who
rely on high-cost credit to purchase essential goods or pay for essential services or push these
consumers to more expensive and predatory alternatives. See, e.g., id. at 315 ("[Substantive
unconscionability] serves only to undercut the private right of contract in a manner that is apt

&
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open-textured prohibitions, such as unconscionability and unfairness or complex
technical rules. 44 With the rise of the Law and Economics movement in the
45
1970s and 1980s, critiques like Epstein's had greater purchase. And in the
following decades, scholars and policymakers would extend these arguments to
48
47
criticize interventions in mortgage lending, 46 student lending, credit cards,
49
and payday lending.

Scholars who favored interventions in consumer financial markets generally
responded to the efficiency revolution in two ways. First, scholars argued that
there were costs associated with nonintervention that extended beyond
individual transactions. 50 In particular, risky loans that pose a high risk of default
5
might push borrowers to increasingly rely on the state for support. 1And the cost

to do more social harm than good."); Andrew T. Hayashi, Myopic Consumer Law, 106 VA.

L. REv. 689, 694 (2020) ("[P]rohibiting credit terms that are designed to tempt present-biased

individuals [to consume goods or services they might under-consume] might hurt those that
the ban is meant to help."); Mann & Hawkins, supra note 4, at 886-95 (arguing that bans on
payday loans might force borrowers to seek worse alternatives).
44 In other words, critiques like Epstein's extended to statutory efforts to ban provisions of
certain consumer contracts, such as the pro rata clause at issue in Williams. See Fleming,
Unconscionability, supra note 31, at 1424-31 (describing passage of installment sales
legislation in Washington, D.C., after Williams).
45 See Herrine, Folklore, supra note 26, at 437 (noting influence of Chicago School over
Reagan-era developments in consumer law).
46 Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and Economics of Subprime Lending,

80 U. CoLo. L. REv. 1, 78-84 (2009) (arguing against suitability standards in mortgage lending
in wake of 2007-2008 financial crisis).
4? See Anthony J. Guida, Jr. & David Figuli, HigherEducation's Gainful Employment and
90/10 Rules: Unintended "Scarlet Letters" for Minority, Low-Income, and Other At-Risk

Students, 79 U. CHI. L. REv. 131, 132 (2012) (arguing that regulations designed to curb
predatory practices by for-profit colleges will eliminate access to education for minority and
at-risk students).
48 See Todd J. Zywicki, The Economics of Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REv. 79, 128 (2000)
(arguing against interventions in credit card markets on efficiency grounds).
49 See Hayashi, supra note 43, at 713-16 (arguing that welfare effects of payday loans

cannot be analyzed without considering goods or services loans are used for).
50 The most notable example of this view is Eric A. Posner, ContractLaw in the Welfare
State: A Defense of the UnconscionabilityDoctrine, Usury Laws, and RelatedLimitations on
the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283 (1995). For other examples, see Amy J.
Schmitz, Females on the Fringe: Considering Gender in Payday Lending Policy, 89 CHI.KENT L. REv. 65, 101-102 (2014), arguing that the "community bears burdens derived from
short-term fringe lending" in the form of increased reliance on state services; and Mann
Hawkins, supra note 4, at 884, arguing that the "best case against payday lending is that the
market is plagued by cognitive failures, unlikely to be well policed by competitive forces, and
likely to generate external costs borne by the rest of society." For a discussion of the longer
history of this view, see generally Anne Fleming, The Public Interest in the PrivateLaw of
the Poor, 14 HARV. L. & PoL'Y REv. 159 (2019) [hereinafter Fleming, Private Law of the
Poor].

SI Posner, supra note 50, at 285.
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of this state support might outweigh any efficiency gains in individual
transactions.5 2

Second, scholars suggested that the set of inefficient transactions might be
much larger than the limited cases of duress or fraud Epstein initially identified.
Scholars generally offered two reasons why seemingly efficient transactions
might be inefficient. The first reason is that lenders might be leveraging
information asymmetries to encourage borrowers to enter transactions they
might otherwise avoid. 53 The second reason is that consumers might be
boundedly rational in a way that causes them to over- or under-borrow. 54 The

second rationale drew heavily from the behavioral psychology literature that
captured the imaginations of liberal scholars and policymakers for the last two
decades. 55
But there are important limits to each of the arguments above. Arguments that

emphasize welfare-benefits might be used to justify a contraction of the welfare
state. Indeed, Anne Fleming argues that a key claim of early consumer advocates

was that consumer credit regulation would "prevent pauperism and thereby
reduce spending on public welfare as well as private charity." 56 Arguments that
lean on information economics and behavioral psychology might rest on shaky

s2 Id.

at 286.
A representative example of this kind of scholarship is Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A.
McCoy's prescient 2002 article, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of
PredatoryLending, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1255, 1280 (2002). See also Howell E. Jackson & Paul
Rothstein, The Analysis of Benefits in Consumer ProtectionRegulations, 9 HARV. Bus. L.
REv. 197, 259 (2019) (explaining that "[i]nformation failures provide a very common
rationale for consumer protection regulations"); Will Dobbie & Paige Marta Skiba,
Information Asymmetries in Consumer Credit Markets: Evidence from Payday Lending, 5
AM. ECON. J. 256, 256 (2013) (analyzing "empirical relevance of asymmetric information
using administrative data from the payday lending market").
54 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly RationalBorrowing, 73 U. CHI. L. REv 249, 250

2

(2006) (providing "a general outline of the reasons that boundedly rational borrowing might
occur and the possible legal remedies"); Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit
Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 9 (2008) (arguing that "[i]mperfect rationality
exacerbates ... problems" in consumer credit markets).
5 See Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How BehavioralEconomics Trims Its Sails and

Why, 127 HARv. L. REv. 1593, 1637-44 (2014) (explaining behavioral revolution and its
influence on development of consumer credit law).
56 Fleming, Private Law of the Poor, supra note 50, at 162 (tracing history of anti-

pauperism arguments in favor of credit restrictions).
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empirical grounds. 57 Moreover, even if the empirics suggest cognitive bias,

59
58
behaviorally based interventions might still be ineffective or inefficient.
The limits of efficiency-oriented arguments have pushed scholars to search
for alternative grounds to justify consumer credit regulation. Some scholars
suggest we appeal to first principles and return to something resembling the
moral norms that shaped historic consumer credit law. Recent suggestions in this
vein include grounding consumer credit law in principles of distributive
62
But appeals to first
justice, 60 human rights, 61 or fundamental fairness.
principles run into site-based critiques.
Site-based critiques do not contest the normative claims of scholars pushing
for intervening in consumer credit markets on non-efficiency grounds. Instead,
these critiques suggest that consumer credit law is not the best way to achieve
any of these first-order goals. The most well-known and influential site-based
63
critique is Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell's "double-distortion" argument.
Kaplow and Shavell argue that pursuing more equity through the law may distort
markets in ways that are in tension with the aims of scholars pushing for more

57 As an example, below are some of the conflicting studies on the cognitive bias in payday
lending. For studies finding bias, see, for example, Nathalie Martin, 1,000% Interest-Good
While Supplies Last: A Study of PaydayLoan Practicesand Solutions, 52 Aluz. L. REv. 563,
568-69 (2010); Marianne Bertrand & Adair Morse, InformationDisclosure, CognitiveBiases,

and PaydayBorrowing, 66 J. FIN. 1865, 1865-68 (2011); and Jesse B. Leary & Jialan Wang,
Liquidity Constraints and Budgeting Mistakes: Evidence from Social Security Recipients 1
(Feb. 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (available at https://conference.nber.org/confer/2016
/LEs16/LearyWang.pdf [https://perma.cc/AZ9U-D984]). For studies not finding bias, see,
for example, Ronald Mann, Assessing the Optimism of Payday Loan Borrowers, 21 SUP. CT.

EcoN. REv. 105, 112 (2013); and Hunt Allcott, Joshua J. Kim, Dmitry Taubinsky & Jonathan

Zinman, Are High-InterestLoans Predatory? Theory and Evidence from PaydayLending 3
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 28799, 2021), https://www.nber.org/system

/files/workingpapers/w28799/w28799.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VWF-2AY8].
58 See Lauren E. Willis, When Nudges Fail: Slippery Defaults, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1155,
1155 (2013) ("[P]olicy defaults intended to protect individuals when firms have the
motivation and means to move consumers out of the default are unlikely to be effective unless
accompanied by substantive regulation."); Bubb & Pildes, supra note 55, at 1647-58
(explaining shortfalls of behavioral-focused intervention and arguing that disclosure forms
"are unlikely to significantly improve outcomes in consumer credit markets").
59 Hayashi, supra note 43, at 689 (finding that payday loan regulations "increased the use
of an alternative credit product and reduced the use of paid tax preparers and the take-up of
the earned income tax credit").
60 See Linarelli, supra note 8, at 423.
61 See Ondersma, supra note 8, at 373.
62 See Schmitz, supra note 7, at 107 ("Unconscionability's historical and philosophical
foundations justify its use as a flexible fairness safety net.").
63 Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the Income
Tax in RedistributingIncome, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 677 (1994).
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equity."M A better approach would be to manage the equity costs of efficient legal
rules through tax-and-transfer systems. 65
There is a vast literature on Kaplow and Shavell's double-distortion argument
and much of it is quite critical. 66 Thus, there are good reasons to be skeptical of
their argument. Moreover, even if Kaplow and Shavell are correct, there are
ways to pursue more distribution in consumer credit law without significantly
distorting market outcomes. 67 But there is a second site-based critique we ought
to worry about: path dependency. Proponents of this view point out that
consumer credit law has often been used as a form of indirect and private social
provision to avoid direct and public social provision. 68 And given this history,
there are reasons to worry that a renewed effort to pursue more equity in

consumer credit law might crowd out other options, which would leave poor and
marginalized communities worse off.
In my view, neither of the two site-based critiques necessarily imperils the
project to seed consumer credit interventions in richer soil. But they highlight a

problem that is common to the rationales detailed in this Part: one of perspective.
The rationales in this Part either explicitly or implicitly share a background
assumption that credit markets are privately ordered. Financial institutions are
best understood as mere intermediaries that link savers with spenders. To
efficiently intermediate, financial institutions need freedom to manage the costs
of intermediation with the tools of access and price. And interventions that take

64

Id.

65 Id
66

See generally, e.g., Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive

Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653 (1998); Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructingthe
New Efficiency Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1003 (2001); Ronen Avraham, David Fortus
& Kyle Logue, Revisiting the Roles of Legal Rules and Tax Rules in Income Redistribution:
A Response to Kaplow & Shavell, 89 IowA L. REV. 1125 (2004); Richard S. Markovits, Why
Kaplow and Shavell's "Double-DistortionArgument" Articles Are Wrong, 13 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 511 (2005); David Gamage, How Should Governments Promote Distributive
Justice?:A FrameworkforAnalyzing the Optimal Choice of Tax Instruments, 68 TAx L. REV.

1 (2014); Zachary Liscow, Reducing Inequality on the Cheap: When Legal Rule Design
Should Incorporate Equity as Well as Efficiency, 123 YALE L.J. 2478 (2014); Lee Anne
Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The DistributiveDeficit in Law andEconomics, 100 MINN.
L. REV. 1051 (2016); Richard L. Revesz, Regulation and Distribution, 93 N.Y.U. L. REv.

1489 (2018); Zachary Liscow, Is Efficiency Biased?, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1649 (2018); see also
Raghavan, supra note 8 (manuscript at 9-18) (summarizing this literature).
67 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
68 See MONICA PRASAD, THE LAND OF Too MUCH: AMERICAN ABUNDANCE AND THE

PARADOX OF POVERTY 227-45 (2012) (finding trade-off between credit and welfare in OECD
countries); Rachel E. Dwyer, Credit, Debt, and Inequality, 44 ANN. REv. Socio. 237, 239
(2018) (arguing that expanded access to credit in place of subsidizing social goods creates
credit-welfare state trade-off (citing PRASAD, supra)); Atkinson, Rethinking Credit, supra
note 24, at 1158 (explaining that "the persistence of talk about low-income Americans' access

to credit indicates that the balance in the public-private American welfare regime has shifted
too far toward individualism and private provision").
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away this freedom will distort consumer credit markets in potentially regressive
ways.

Anyone who seeks to unsettle consumer credit markets must demonstrate that
interventions will not distort markets or that some distortion is tolerable. But this
is not the only way to conceptualize the shape of markets and the costs of
interventions. There is an alternative perspective that denaturalizes the market
by detailing the way the law structures exchange. And this richer, descriptive
account can help explain interventions that are otherwise difficult to defend.
Structural approaches to legal and economic problems are not new but are
newly relevant. The next Part details the emerging structuralism in consumer
law scholarship and considers how we may leverage some of these insights to
reconceptualize problems in consumer credit markets.
II.

THE STRUCTURAL TURN: BEYOND MARKET FAILURE

As noted in the introduction, there is an emerging shift in legal scholarship
away from conceptualizing markets as unstructured and self-correcting to

legally structured and actively governed. Part of this structural turn includes
recent scholarship on housing finance and student finance where scholars
foreground the way the law shapes these markets and consider the distributive

69
Key conclusions of this
implications of particular legal arrangements.

scholarship are that legal changes in the late twentieth century reshaped
mortgage lending and student lending in ways that reallocated the benefits and
burdens of these markets, and reform of these markets requires more than
solving for market failure or policing bad conduct. In this Part, I briefly describe
this recent scholarship on housing and student finance. I then suggest how we
might extend these insights to reconceptualize problems in fringe financial
markets.
Housing Finance

A.

The wave of mortgage defaults and foreclosures that followed the financial
crisis of 2008 revealed that there were deep problems in mortgage markets.
Following the crisis, there was extensive debate about why so many risky loans
were originated and sold. One way to explain these problems in consumer
scholarship was to focus on predatory lending practices. As explained in Part I,
consumer credit markets feature large imbalances between financial institutions
and consumers across multiple dimensions. Scholars argued that market changes
prior to the crisis put financial institutions in a position where they could take
advantage of these imbalances on an unprecedented scale. 70 And this predatory

See infra Sections I.A, I.B.
70 See generally, e.g., Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, DEMOCRACY, Summer 2007,
1; KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. McCoy, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT,
69

at

REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS (2016); Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory

StructuredFinance, 28 CARDozo L. REv. 2185 (2007).
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behavior precipitated a wave of defaults that metastasized into a global financial
panic.

Recently, some scholars have offered a different account that foregrounds the
state's role in shaping mortgage markets. 71 The American mortgage market
features extensive government involvement. 72 The federal government engages
in direct lending, insures mortgages, provides secondary market liquidity, and
indirectly subsidizes the mortgage market in other ways. 73 Many of these
interventions were products of New Deal efforts to reform the housing market
after the Great Depression. 74 And these interventions fundamentally reshaped
the mortgage market from a small, private, and extremely risky market to a large,
public, and stable market. 75
Prior to the Great Depression, most mortgage loans were short-term, interest-

only loans that required significant down payments. 76 These loans were made
primarily to small farmers, and performance turned on seasonal farm income,
which was notoriously unstable. 77 The pre-Depression mortgage market featured
regular cycles of default, foreclosure, and collapse in housing prices. 78 The
extensive New Deal interventions converted these risky, short-term loans into

stable, long-term loans. 79 The thirty-year, fixed-rate, amortizing mortgagewhat's become the canonical example of a plain and safe loan product-was
created out of whole cloth by the federal government. 80
For scholars such as Adam Levitin and Susan Wachter, the problems in the
mortgage market were not solely the product of market failure or predatory
practices. 8 1 Instead, these problems grew out of legal changes in the late
twentieth century, where the government ceded public control of the mortgage

market to private institutions. 82 These changes would convert the mortgage

71 See, e.g., LEVITIN & WACHTER, supra note 13, at 16; GRETA R. KRIPPNER, CAPITALIZING
ON CRISIS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF THE RISE OF FINANCE 2 (2012); SARAH L. QUINN,
AMERICAN BONDS: How CREDIT MARKETS SHAPED A NATION (2019).
72 See LEvITIN & WACHTER, supra note 13, at 38.
73
?4

Id
Id

75 Id.

Id at 16, 21.
77 Id. at 23.
78 Id
79 Id at 40.
76

80 Id. at 38. Indeed, Adam Levitin and Susan Wachter call this product the "American
Mortgage" to highlight its public roots. Id at 54.
81 Levitin and Wachter's specific story of the bubble is that it was a was a supply-side
phenomenon caused by features that are endemic to private mortgage finance. Id at xi ("the
shift from regulated agency securitization to unregulated [private-label securitization]
produced an oversupply of underpriced mortgage finance in the form of [Depression Era]
bullet loans.").
82 See id. at 106 ("Freed of its New Deal regulations, the U.S. mortgage market
quickly
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market into a publicly guaranteed but privately managed market and lead to the
same unstructured and unsafe lending practices that prevailed prior to the Great
Depression. Only now, mortgage markets were much larger and more liquid,
and the costs were borne by a much larger class of people.

Thus, intervening in mortgage markets is less about remedying market failure
and more about repairing our broken housing finance infrastructure to reallocate
market risk. 83 Indeed, as the federal government is heavily involved in mortgage
markets, housing regulation is really not best understood as an intervention at
all. Instead, it is a way to change market governance and progressively
redistribute the benefits and burdens of housing fmance: In the next Section, I
suggest that we can tell a similar story about student fmance.
Student Finance

B.

The explosive growth in student debt over the last fifteen years has made
problems in student lending particularly salient. One way to understand

problems in the student lending market is as the product of predatory behavior
by lenders and financial institutions. 84 But an alternative account that is
increasingly gaining purchase is to understand these problems as fundamentally
shaped by federal policy. 85
For most of the twentieth century, higher education was directly subsidized
86
by the federal government in the form of reduced tuition and education grants.
This structure would change in the 1970s, when, for a variety of reasons, higher

education policy would shift from direct subsidies, low tuition, and limited
student borrowing to indirect subsidies, higher tuition, and significant student
borrowing. 87 In particular, the government would provide less direct aid to
reverted to Depression-Era 'bullet' loans, shifting interest rate and refinancing risk back to
borrowers.").
83 As an example, Adam Levitin and Susan Wachter propose creating a new federally
chartered corporation that would act as a single purchaser and guarantor of mortgages and
issuer of mortgage-backed securities, which would reallocate interest rate risk to capital
markets and credit risk to the federal government. Id. at 255-61.
8 See Sarah Ann Schade, Reining in the PredatoryNatureof For-ProfitColleges, 56 ARiz.
L. REv. 317, 320 (2014); Joseph Sanders & Vijay Raghavan, Improvident Student Lending,
2018 UTAH L. REv. 919, 930. See generally TRESSIE MCMILLAN COTTOM, LOWER ED: THE
TROUBLING RISE OF FOR-PROFIT COLLEGES

IN THE NEW ECONOMY

(2017).

See SUZANNE METTLER, DEGREES OF INEQUALITY: HOW THE POLITICS OF HIGHER
EDUCATION SABOTAGED THE AMERICAN DREAM 10-12 (2014); Glater, supranote 13, at 157785

79; Brooks, supra note 13, at 245 (discussing evolution of higher education policy from direct
grants to student loans and income-driven repayment as tool to unwind regressivity of student
loans).
86 See METTLER, supra note 85, at 5-7, 51-64 (2014); Brooks, supra note 13, at 245-46.

87 A common explanation is that this shift was the product of changing political and
economic conditions. Rapidly rising tuition costs and declining state budgets during this time
put significant strain on the then-existing regulatory framework in higher education. See
Brooks, supra note 13, at 246. The legislative response to these economic and fiscal changes

&
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students and institutions and instead provide subsidies to financial institutions to
lend to students at favorable rates. 88
This shifted the burdens of financing the cost of higher education from the
general public to individual students. 89 Rather than pay a reduced rate for tuition
with grants, students are charged a higher rate but defer payment until after
graduation. Students then repay in increments over an extended period. While
wealthier students might fare better under this scheme, lower-income students
likely fare worse as they devote more disposable income to financing the cost of
education. 90
In other words, the shift in education policy in the late twentieth century
reallocated the cost of financing higher education in a somewhat regressive
way. 91 Whereas, prior to the shift, the cost of financing higher education was
largely borne by the public, after the shift, the cost would be borne largely by
students. 92 And this meant that students who derived the least benefit from their
education would bear a higher burden as a percentage of their income. For
scholars such as Jonathan Glater and John Brooks, the problems in the student
lending market are not solely a function of predatory behavior but also a function
of federal policy. 93 And solving problems in student lending

requires

reallocating the burdens of financing higher education in some manner. 94 In the
next Section, I suggest we can reconceptualize problems and solutions in fringe
financial markets in a similar way.

was to scale back direct subsidies for tuition and expand indirect subsidies for student loans.
See METTLER, supra note 85, at 64-68. Suzanne Mettler suggests that this legislative response

was a product of both policy "drift" and the innate characteristics of higher education law. Id.
at 67 (quoting Jacob Hacker, Privatizing Risk Without Privatizing the Welfare State: The
Hidden Politics of Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States, 98 AM. POL. SCi. REv.
243, 246 (2004)). Per Mettler, the politics of fiscal-conservatism led lawmakers to respond to
rising tuition and declining state budgets by scaling back Pell grant spending and expanding
student loans. Id. at 76.
88 METTLER, supra note 85, at 64-68.

See Brooks, supra note 13, at 246.
See id. The shift from grants to loans not only deepened the wealth gap but also deepened
the racial wealth gap. See Andre M. Perry, Marshall Steinbaum & Carl Romer, Student Loans,
the Racial Wealth Divide, and Why We Need Full Student Debt Cancellation, BRooKNGs
89

90

INST. (June 23, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/research/student-loans-the-racial-wealthdivide-and-why-we-need-full-student-debt-cancellation/ [https://perma.cc/KW5T-K48U].
91 See Glater, supra note 13, at 1563 (arguing that "rising tuition and growing use of
education loans reallocate risk to students and their families and make paying for college
excessively risky"); Brooks, supra note 13, at 246.
92 Brooks, supra note 13, at 246.
93 See Glater, supra note 13, at 1563-64; Brooks, supra note 13, at 258.
94 See Glater, supra note 13, at 1563-64; Brooks, supra note 13, at 258; John R. Brooks
Adam J. Levitin, Redesigning Education Finance: How Student Loans Outgrew the "Debt"

Paradigm, 109 GEO. L.J. 5, 5 (2020) ("[T]he student loan crisis is due not to the scale of
student loan debt, but to the federal education finance system's failure to utilize its existing
mechanisms for progressive, income-based payments and debt cancellation.").
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Neochartalism and Fringe Finance

C.

A structural approach to the problems in fringe financial markets may seem
odd at first blush. Mortgage lending and student lending feature direct and longstanding state involvement. 95 Thus, it is sensible that scholars are increasingly
conceptualizing problems in those markets in broader terms. But fringe financial
markets do not appear to bear any obvious state imprint. Instead, economic

factors seem to drive the demand for fringe financial products.
Here is a conventional account: Consumers need money to engage in

economic life. But, for a variety of reasons, poor consumers lack sufficient cash
to pay for basic and emergency expenses. 96 Whereas wealthier consumers can
rely on low-cost credit and insurance to smooth consumption between pay

periods and manage emergencies, poor consumers have limited access to these
markets because their finances are unstable. 97 Financial instability poses risk and
creditors manage this risk by charging poor consumers what seems like

excessive rates for access to credit. 98 Yet these rates, though facially excessive,
are sensible given the high likelihood that poor consumers will default on their
obligations. 99
This conventional account of supply and demand in fringe financial markets
suggests that the state plays little to no role in the structure of these markets. But
there is an alternate way to conceptualize problems with consumer credit
markets that foregrounds the state's role. And that is to understand these
problems as money problems that stem from the legal design of money. To make

sense of this claim, it is helpful to understand the different ways one might
conceptualize money.

Broadly speaking, there are two different ways to think about money: as a
neutral medium or as legally constructed. 100 Under the neutral view, lending is

9
96

See supra Sections I.A, II.B.
See Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 82 Fed. Reg.

54472, 54474 (Nov. 17, 2017) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1041) ("[C]onsumers living paycheck
to paycheck and with little to no savings have also used credit as a means of coping with
financial shortfalls.").
97 See, e.g., Adair Morse, Payday Lenders: Heroes or Villains?, 102 J. FrN. ECON. 28, 30
(2011) ("Individuals restricted in access to credit [offered by mainstream banking, mortgage
companies, and credit cards] resort to borrowing from high interest lenders.").
98 See Jim Hawkins, Earned Wage Access and the End of Payday Lending, 101 B.U. L.

REv. 705, 708 (2021) (explaining that core complaint against payday loans is that they "are
simply too expensive").
99 See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 4, at 861-65 (discussing economics of payday
lending).
11 There are alternative ways to characterize these competing perspectives. See Morgan
Ricks, Money as Infrastructure, 2018 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 757, 758 (explaining two

competing paradigms have dominated understandings of banking and its regulation: the
intermediation paradigm and the money paradigm); MICHAEL O'MALLEY, FACE VALUE: THE
ENTwINED HISToRIES OF MONEY & RACE [N AMERICA 4 (2012) (explaining that, for two
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mostly a private affair and money is ancillary to "real" exchange. For proponents
of this view, money emerged as a technological solution to problems with
primitive barter economies. Money is best understood as downstream of
markets: money represents value that precedes exchange. Thus, money is best
understood as a neutral medium that does not shape exchange but merely
facilitates it.
The neutral view was largely dominant in the twentieth century and
undergirds the conventional account of demand in fringe financial markets I
describe above. Under this view, financial institutions are best understood as
mere intermediaries that link savers with spenders. 101 To efficiently
intermediate, financial institutions need freedom to manage the costs of
intermediation with the tools of access and price.10 2 And interventions that take
away this freedom will distort consumer credit markets in regressive ways. 103
Under the alternative perspective-which I'll call the legal view-money is
legally constructed and upstream of markets. In other words, the legal design of
money matters and shapes exchange. The legal nature of money was once well-

understood by the broader public, and the institutional design of money was a
site of political contestation throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries.1 04 However, throughout most of the twentieth century, the legal nature
of money was minimized and obscured by scholars and policymakers.1 05
The economic crises of the last two decades have brought the legal nature of
money into sharp focus and revitalized the long dormant legal view of money.
Neochartalists, or new proponents of the legal view,1 06 make three important
claims about the nature of money that are particularly relevant here. The first is
that creating and disseminating money is a state project, and the institutional
design of money shapes exchange and has distributive implications. 107 As
Christine Desan explains, history reveals that money did not arise as a technical

hundred years, American debates over money took place between two basic camps: hard
money and soft money). I opt here for neutral vs. legal as a broader way to characterize the
debate beyond the best understanding of banks and regulation or the amount of money we
ought to have and the way we should determine its value.
10! Ricks, supra note 100, at 758.
102 Id at 765.
103

Id.

104 Mehrsa Baradaran, Banking on Democracy, 98 WASH. U. L. REv. 353, 399-409 (2020);
Nadav Orion Peer, Negotiating the Lender of Last Resort: The 1913 FederalReserve Act as

a Debate over Credit Distribution, 15 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 367, 372-86 (2019); O'MALLEY,
supra note 100, at 138.
105 Roy Kreitner, Money in the 1890s: The Circulationof Politics, Economics, andLaw, 1
U.C. IRvINE L. REv. 975,977 (2011).
106 See GRAEBER, supra note 15, at 46-52 (discussing chartalism and state theories of
money); Tankus & Herrine, supra note 12 (manuscript at 2) (discussing emergence of

neochartalism).
107 DESAN, supra note 15, at 1.
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solution to problems with primitive exchange but as "a governance project"
created and designed to facilitate state building. 108
Money, in Desan's account, is invented by a community to "denominate[] in
a homogenous way the disparate contributions received from members, and
recognizes them as a medium and mode of payment."1 09 In medieval England,
the "disparate contributions" from community members were denominated in
metal coins minted by the state that could be used for exchange and redeemed
for taxes. 1 0 With the onset of capitalism, making money would shift from the
state to private institutions in a way that buried the public nature of the project.'
Desan's history seeks to recover an older understanding of money as "a medium
constructed publicly with costs and profits that are material."" 2 For Desan,
creating and distributing money is not a costless enterprise but a costly one with
distributive implications."

3

As Desan explains: "the process [of making money]

allocates expenses and profits across many parties, including the tax-paying
public, those buying money for its cash services, and the stakeholder-who can
be a small ruler, a sovereign state, or an agent like a bank licensed to multiply
the public unit of account."" 4 Thus, the project of making money is
fundamentally a political project, which Desan shows "has been a profoundly
5
important and deeply contested project" throughout history."

The second claim about the nature of money is that in our current institutional
order, we rely on private financial institutions to expand the money supply by

distributing public obligations in something that resembles a franchise
relationship."1 6 As Robert Hockett and Saule Omarova explain, the full faith and
credit of our government flows through the financial system as "publicly
accommodated and monetized private liabilities."" 7 Banks create private
liabilities by issuing deposits.' 18 These private bank liabilities are then publicly
accommodated (taken on as a public liability) and monetized (spendable like
currency) by the Federal Reserve through reserve accounting.1

9

Thus, banks are

108 Id.
109 Id at 24.
110 Id. at 62.

Id. at 2.
Id at 50.
13 Id at 49-50.

112

"4 Id. at 50.
''5 Id

116 Hockett & Omarova, supra note 16, at 1147-48.
"7 Id. at 1147 (emphasis omitted).
18

Id. at 1159-60.

'19 Id at 1161-62; see also Desan, supra note 17, at 14 ("Commercial banks issue credit

denominated in the official unit of account in the form of promises-to-pay money to one
sovereign or another. Those representations of private credit-bank deposits-are treated as

money, not just credit: they hold immediate purchasing power.").
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not mere private intermediaries but public instrumentalities that expand the
money supply through credit generation.1 2 0

The third claim is that banks create and disseminate new money through
private extensions of credit.121 Much of our new money is issued by banks as
credit.1 22 Banks' lending decisions affect how much money is in circulation.1 23
And the criteria that banks use to determine who gets a loan and on what terms
can shape economic outcomes and the distribution of resources.1 24
If these claims are correct, then a few things follow. The first is that consumer
credit is a way to create and distribute publicly accommodated private money.
The second is that the fees banks charge for consumer credit (e.g., interest and
penalties) are ways to finance the private disbursement of public obligations.
And the third is that criteria that banks use to determine the cost of credit and
access to credit are ways to distribute the burdens of disbursing public
obligations through private means.
If these ideas seem a bit abstract, consider the daily transactions of modem
life. Purchasing coffee, riding the train, buying groceries, ordering dinnerthese transactions are routinely paid for with credit. Credit cards increasingly
account for a larger share of all payments, while cash accounts for a smaller
share. For example, credit cards accounted for 27% of all payments in 2020, up
from 17% in 2012.125 By contrast, cash accounted for 19% of all payments in
2020, down from 40% in 2012.126 Moreover, many retailers and small businesses

now refuse to accept cash and only take electronic payments.
Thus, regular access to money is not just a way to smooth consumption or to
pay for emergencies but is necessary to participate in the consumer economy.

Yet, as noted above, many poor consumers only have sporadic access to money
at a very high cost. These consumers cannot get low-cost credit cards with
forgiving terms and instead must turn to expensive alternatives such as overdraft,
installment loans, payday loans, and title loans.

120

Hockett & Omarova, supra note 16, at 1164.

121 JACKSON & DYSON, supra note 17, at 21-22.
122 Id at 22; see also Desan, supra note 17, at 14 (noting that "[m]oney

issued by
commercial banks [has been] a profuse source of money since the nineteenth century").
123 JACKSON & DYSON, supra note 17, at 22.
124 Id. at 156-59.
125 KELSEY COYLE, LAURA KIM & SHAUN O'BRIEN, FED. RSRV. SYS., CASH PROD.
OFF.,
2021

FINDINGS

FROM

THE

DIARY

OF

CONSUMER

PAYMENT

CHOICE

3

(2021),

https://www.frbsf.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2021-findings-from-the-diary-ofconsumer-payment-choice-may2021.pdf [https://perma.cc/RQJ4-NXQM] (noting increase in

credit card share of payments for 2020 driven by decrease in use of other payment
instruments); CLAIRE GREENE, SCOTT SCHUH & JOANNA STAVINS, FED. RSRV. BANK OF Bos.,

THE 2012 DIARY OF CONSUMER PAYMENT CHOICE 8 (2018), https://www.atlantafed.org//media/documents/banking/consumer-payments/research-data-reports/2018/the-2012-diary(finding most
[https://perma.cc/P99Z-2X5B]
of-consumer-payment-choice/rdrl801.pdf

commonly used payment instrument was cash, followed by debit and credit cards).
126 COYLE ET AL., supra note 125, at 3; GREENE ET AL., supra note 125, at 8.
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Our current legal regime is a permissive one. With some exceptions, banks

27
are generally free to allocate money on their own terms.1 Banks choose to
28
manage the costs of money creation' in a way that privileges those whose
29
income, assets, and borrowing history are organized to signal low credit risk.1
Individuals who are deemed creditworthy (i.e., a low credit risk) have regular
access to money at nominal costs; individuals deemed uncreditworthy (i.e., a
130
high credit risk) have limited access to money at exceedingly high costs.
Price of and access to credit are ways to distribute the benefits (access to new
money) and burdens (the costs of new money) of our present institutional
arrangement. Because the price of credit and access to credit are tied to wealth,
these benefits and burdens are distributed regressively. Those with more wealth
receive greater benefits (easier access to new money) with lower burdens (less
cost), and those with less wealth receive fewer benefits (less access to new
money) with greater burdens (higher cost). Although credit risk is the way banks
rationalize allocating new money in this fashion, credit risk is not the only
determinant of price or access. In some cases, banks explicitly cross-subsidize
the cost of credit by imposing higher fees on lower-income consumers to
subsidize lower fees to higher-income consumers.'31
The situation in consumer credit markets is, in many ways, similar to the
situation in housing and student finance. Consumer credit markets are publicly
constructed, but access to credit is privately mediated. As with housing and
student finance, consumer credit markets are loosely regulated, which means
benefits and burdens are distributed unevenly and regressively. Poorer
consumers generally share a disproportionate burden of financing this
32
arrangement relative to their wealthier peers.'

Unlike housing and student finance, there was no large policy shift from a
fully federal system to a fragmented and private one. Our current institutional

33
arrangement has largely been the same since the Civil War.1 But there have

127 See Desan, supra note 17, at 15 (arguing that "credit money enters circulation
selectively: it is an advance (a credit) made to some people relative to others").
128 This includes operational costs and the fees banks charge for the private distribution of

public obligations. See Omarova, supra note 21, at 1239.

129

See Dwyer, supra note 68, at 242.

130 Baradaran, supra note 104, at 361.
131 See Natasha Sarin, Making Consumer Finance Work, 119 COLUM. L. REv. 1519, 1569

(2019) (discussing regressive cross-subsidies in consumer financial markets).
132 This is because of higher fees and the declining marginal utility of income. See
Baradaran, supra note 104, at 361; see also Raghavan, supra note 8 (manuscript at 17)

(explaining goods are either "rich-biased" or "poor-biased" depending on marginal utility of
consumption in relation to income).
133 See generally Lev Menand, Why Supervise Banks? The Foundationsof the American
Monetary Settlement, 74 VAND. L. REv. 951 (2021) [hereinafter Menand, Why Supervise
Banks]. To be sure, although our basic arrangement of using commercial banks to expand the
money supply has been in place since the civil war, the governance and regulatory structure
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been a series of legal and technological changes in the late twentieth century that
made problems in these markets more acute.134 In the next part, I explain how
reorienting our perspective can help us reconsider the purpose and value of
consumer credit regulation.
III.

IMPLICATIONS

Reconceptualizing problems in consumer credit markets as money problems
that stem from the legal design of money might be interesting, but is it useful?
In this Part, I suggest this framing has two important virtues. First, it reveals the

public nature of consumer credit markets and how interventions in these markets
are less about unsettling private exchanges and more about incidence shifting.
Second, it allows one to support more consumer credit regulation without
believing in the generative potential of consumer credit markets.
A.

Shifting Burdens in FringeFinance

Modern debates over the wisdom of consumer credit regulation tend to
conceptualize markets as unstructured and self-correcting. Conceptualizing
markets as purely private means that interventions may distort market outcomes
in inefficient and regressive ways. There are ways to deal with these objections,
but none of them are perfect. Reconceptualizing markets as actively governed

and legally structured illustrates that the obsession with market distortions is
misguided.
If markets are legally constructed, then markets are never truly distorted or
out of equilibrium. Instead, markets are contingent arrangements that are
constituted to achieve a particular distributive outcome. Mortgage markets
evolved out of New Deal interventions designed to spread the benefits of
homeownership to white borrowers in order to revive the American economy.
Financial deregulation in the late twentieth century reallocated the benefits and

burdens of housing finance in ways that were regressive and deepened existing
racial disparities in the housing market. Modern efforts to reform mortgage
markets are thus best understood as a progressive reallocation of the benefits and
burdens in housing finance.
The student lending market evolved out of legal changes in the 1960s and
1970s that shifted the cost of financing higher education onto students in order
to manage a complex set of political, social, and economic pressures. Recent
changes such as the elimination of private federal loans and the introduction of

has shifted over time. See supra note 104 and accompanying text; Lev Menand, The Logic
and Limits of the Federal Reserve Act 21-22 (Feb. 10, 2022) (unpublished manuscript)
(available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4031875 [https://perma.cc
/4WLK-ZY6K]).
3

See ANNE FLEMING, CITY OF DEBTORS: A CENTURY OF FRINGE FINANCE 21346 (2018)

(discussing unraveling of state consumer credit law in late twentieth century); KRIPPNER,

supra note 71, at 58-86 (discussing deregulation of financial markets).
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income-based repayment are best understood as efforts to progressively
135
redistribute the benefits and burdens in student finance.
We can tell a similar story about money and consumer credit. Our current
institutional arrangement of using commercial banks to expand the money
supply was initially setup to solve the "extremely difficult governance problem
136
As Lev Menand explains, "us[ing]
[of] creating an elastic money supply."

specially chartered banks to create money and supervisors to act as outsources,
overseeing the managers who operate banks" was perceived as a "middle
course" that would "diffus[e] the power [over money creation while]
constraining it as much as possible." 137 But there were important distributive
consequences to this decision. As Christine Desan explains, banks "have no
reason to issue money evenly across the population," and as a result, bank money
is often issued selectively and unevenly. 138
Throughout our history, various stakeholders have fought to rewrite the terms
of this settlement 139 and shift power away from banks. Many scholars have
written about the way agrarian populists fought for and changed monetary
governance in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.1 40 And today,
some scholars are again calling for a similar shift on democratic grounds.141 One
way to understand consumer credit regulation in this context is as a tool to shift
power and redistribute burdens in consumer credit markets.
As an example, consider an interest rate cap with a universal access mandate.

On the one hand, these interventions would decrease costs for poor consumers
42
by decreasing the cost of credit and expanding access to credit.1 On the other
hand, these interventions would likely increase costs for banks and rich
consumers. 14 3 And this cost-increase might distort the efficient allocation of
resources in the consumer credit markets.

135 See Brooks, supra note 13, at 258.

136 Menand, Why Supervise Banks, supra note 133, at 958.
137 Id. at 951, 958.
38 Desan, supra note 17, at 5.
139 See Menand, Why Supervise Banks, supra note 133, at 958 (referring to our current
institutional arrangement as "The American Monetary Settlement").
140 See supra notes 104-05; PRASAD, supra note 68, at 10.
141 See Baradaran, supra note 104, at 362; K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities:Private
Power, Social Infrastructure, and the Revival of the Public Utility Concept, 39 CARDozo L.

REv. 1621, 1625 (2018) (arguing public utility-style concepts can help conceptualize and
respond to contemporary problems where private actors have concentrated control over
essential goods and services); John Crawford, Lev Menand & Morgan Ricks, FedAccounts:
DigitalDollars, 89 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 113, 116 (2021); Omarova, supra note 21, at 1234-

35.
142 To be sure, the incidence of a rate cap is subject to extensive debate. For a summary of
this debate and a discussion of a broader set of regulatory tools we might use to redistribute
income in consumer law, see generally Raghavan, supra note 8.
143 Banks may try to cross-subsidize these costs by raising prices on rich consumers.
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But if consumer credit is new money, and price and access are ways to finance
the private disbursement of public obligations, then a rate cap and mandate are
merely ways to shift incidence in the consumer credit markets. Indeed, a rate
cape coupled with a mandate is best understood as a way to shift costs between
market participants and not as an intervention to cure market failure.
Acknowledging this fact does not mean that rate caps, mandates, or any similar
measures are always wise. Nor does it mean that efficiency is irrelevant. It just
means that the wisdom of a particular legal change involves a different set of
tradeoffs than those that we presently debate.
Incidence Shifting, not SocialProvision

B.

Reconceptualizing problems in fringe markets not only offers a different way
to think about the value of consumer credit regulation, but it provides a partial
answer to one of the sharpest challenges to consumer credit law in recent years.
Across several articles, Abbye Atkinson has identified fundamental flaws with
the normative aims of consumer scholarship and advocacy.14 4 Consumer
scholars and advocates tend to view credit as essential to the "economic wellbeing" of low-income communities because it can serve as a mechanism to
smooth consumption or "as a catalyst for social mobility."14 5 For these scholars
and advocates, consumer credit regulation is desirable because it can expand
access to this particularly vital resource.

Atkinson identifies two important problems with this view. The first is that
credit is an intertemporal transfer of wealth, shifting "an individual's future
capital to facilitate present consumption." 146 If there is no interperiod
redistribution, credit can only work as a social provision if the borrower's
economic standing improves between when the debt is incurred and must be
repaid.14 7 And there is little evidence that private credit facilitates this economic
transformation.1 48 The second issue is that credit that cannot be repaid becomes
debt, which has often functioned as a mechanism to subordinate
socioeconomically marginalized groups. 4 9 Thus, when consumer credit is used
as our exclusive form of social provision, it can compound inequality and deepen
the racial wealth gap.
One important takeaway from Atkinson's work is that we should focus less
on tackling inequality through indirect social provision (i.e., credit) and more on
direct social provision (i.e., transfers).1 50 And this raises an important question:

What is the normative case for consumer credit regulation? If consumer credit
144 See Atkinson, Rethinking Credit,supra note 24; Abbye Atkinson, Borrowing
Equality,

120 COLUM. L. REv. 1403 (2020).
14' Atkinson, Rethinking Credit, supra note 24, at 1096-97.
146

Id at 1098.

147 Id. at 1099.
148

Id.

149 Atkinson, BorrowingEquality, supra note 144, at 1406.

10 Id at 1161.

'
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5
regulation has often been pursued to the exclusion of direct social provision,'
and if access to credit without a robust social safety net means that that credit
will often function as a tool of inequality and subordination, shouldn't we focus

our energy on expanding the social safety net and ignore consumer credit

markets? 52

This Essay suggests that at least part of the answer to the normative question

lies in understanding consumer credit as new money. The legal design of money
has distributive implications. How we choose to allocate new money determines
how resources are allocated in our society. For this reason, proposals to
nationalize our banking system, such as Saule Omarova's public ledger,
contemplate allocating new money in a neutral or progressive way.
Distributional concerns do not disappear when the monetary system is a
kludgy public-private hybrid like our own. In many ways, these concerns

become more acute. If we move to a world in which the state provides more
direct social provision but leaves consumer credit markets largely unregulated,
rich consumers will continue to have access to new money at comparably

cheaper rates, which would discount the value of direct social provision.
Moreover, because new money creation through credit markets is often
inherently regressive (for the reasons Atkinson suggests), it is arguably more
important to constrain new money creation in a private system than it might be

in a purely public system.
Thus, we ought to pursue consumer credit regulation to unwind the
regressivity of money creation in our system even if consumer credit is a poor
form of social provision. To be sure, this is only a partial answer to Atkinson's

challenge. In earlier work, Atkinson suggests that consumer credit's value is
partially a function of particular legal arrangements.

54

Consumer credit is not

necessarily a tool of subordination but can function as a tool of subordination
where the existing legal order privileges credit (to the exclusion of direct social
provision) and penalizes debt. In more recent work, Atkinson offers a deeper
structual critique of consumer credit. Consumer credit in this account is a device
capitalist economies use to commodify marginalized status and extract surplus
value from this marginalization. 5

151 See PRASAD, supra note 68, at 250 (2012) (postulating that "a set of progressive
interventions taken [by the United States] during the early twentieth century produced
decidedly non-progressive results"); see also Rachel E. Dwyer, Credit, Debt, and Inequality,

44 ANN. REv. Socio. 237, 239 (2018) (discussing credit-welfare trade-off).
52 Cf Pamela Foohey & Sara S. Greene, Credit Scoring Duality, 86 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBs. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 22) (available at https://papers.ssm.com/sol3

/papers.cfin?abstractid=3992749 [https://perma.cc/S7QX-MNG2]) (making a similar point
about combatting harms in credit scoring).
I" Omarova, supra note 21, at 1239.
1 This account is reflected in Atkinson, Rethinking Credit, supra note 24; and Atkinson,
Borrowing Equality, supra note 144.
I This understanding is most evident in Atkinson's recent article. Abbye Atkinson,
Commodifying Marginalization,71 DUKE L.J. 773 (2022).

1326

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 102:1301

Whether consumer credit regulation is normatively desirable turns on which
account you believe is correct. If credit is fundamentally a tool of subordination
and extraction, then it is hard to argue that shaving down credit's rougher edges
will change its nature. But if the costs of credit are a function of particular legal
arrangements, and less about credit's fundamental nature, then we may be able
to change the law. And it is possible to imagine a world in which less regressive
credit markets are both obtainable and desirable.1 56
CONCLUSION

The current cost structure in consumer credit markets is a political choice. It
is a choice to allocate the costs of distributing our money in a regressive way.
We are not bound by this choice, and we can regulate price and access in order
to shift the burdens in consumer credit markets. As noted above, acknowledging
this fact does not mean that regulating price and access is always wise or that
efficiency is irrelevant. It just means that the wisdom of a particular legal change
involves a different set of tradeoffs than those that we presently debate.
For example, we may conclude that an elastic money supply justifies

regressive pricing. Given their superior knowledge, banks are in the best position
to efficiently allocate credit, 157 and we ought to be careful about constraining
their freedom. On the other hand, we may think equity concerns outweigh
efficiency concerns in the allocation of credit. My goal here is not to suggest that
resolving these tradeoffs is easy but instead to suggest that reconceptualizing
problems in consumer credit markets can help us honestly engage with the actual
tradeoffs involved with a legal change.

In other words, even if consumer financial law is not a good site for
distribution and may crowd out other options, we cannot ignore distribution in
regulating consumer credit markets. Consumer credit markets are sites where we
make critical decisions about how to distribute resources. Distribution is
inherent in the design of consumer credit markets. Determining how we allocate
benefits and burdens in consumer credit markets turns on our values. 158
Refusing to "intervene" in consumer credit markets or choosing to prioritize
allocative efficiency is not distributionally neutral. It reflects a judgment that
156 Cf Monica Prasad, Histories ofHammers, LAW & POL. ECON. PROJECT (Aug.
26, 2021),
https://lpeproject.org/blog/histories-of-hammers/
[https://perma.cc/LR8H-638F] (making
similar point with respect to municipal bond financing).
1 See Desan, supra note 17, at 20 (explaining that case for granting commercial banks
control over money creation stems from their purported expertise in allocating credit).
"5 Cf Glater, supra note 13, at 1564 ("[D]etermining the desirability of a particular risk
distribution [in student finance] requires identifying goals, such as a target number of college
graduates or matriculants. There is no baseline for these assessments; they should be subjects
of public debate."); Herrine, Consumer Protection, supra note 1 (manuscript at 5) (arguing
that reorienting consumer protection along a "moral economy view treats consumer markets
as contingent ways to solve problems of social provision," which necessarily involves "the

question of which values should govern" and "whose interests should be represented and
how").
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resources should be distributed regressively in order to promote other goals.
There may be merit to that position. But the burden of justification ought to be
on those who seek to preserve this regressive arrangement and not on those who
seek to unsettle it.
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